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EXECUTION OF FOREIGN SENTENCES IN THE
UNITED STATES: A TREATY WITH MEXICO
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, JR.

The United States has embarked on a significant venture into the field
of international criminal law by executing a treaty allowing reciprocal
enforcement of foreign criminal sanctions.' Previous development of an
international criminal law has been hampered by jealously guarded principles of territorial sovereignty and municipal law.' These principles receive
particular expression in the United States through insistence on individual
guarantees of due process. 3 Any attempt to compromise them will meet
strong resistance. This comment examines the provisions of the treaty and
their effect on these principles by analyzing the due process requirements
which have been established by the courts, Congress, and international
convention.
THE TREATY WITH MEXICO

Background and Purpose
The treaty is a result of the coincidence of Mexican and American concern for citizens incarcerated in foreign jails. In the United States the
political forces set in motion by increasing public attention to the problem
of prisoner treatment in Mexico have encouraged the execution of the
agreement. Dramatic press accounts of Mexican jailbreaks,' private investigations,5 letters from prisoners,' and a Congressional investigation have
1. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, United States-Mexico
[hereinafter cited as Treaty].
2. See Fuller, Jurisdiction Over Offenses with a Foreign Element, in 2 A TREATISE ON
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5, 38-39 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda ed. 1973); Schwarzenberger,
The Problem of an International Criminal Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3, 35 (G.
Mueller & E. Wise ed. 1965).
3. See Mueller, InternationalJudicialAssistance in Criminal Matters, 7 VILL. L. REv.
193, 220 (1961-62).
4. See Reid, The Great Mexican Jailbreak, TEx. MONTHLY, Sept. 1976, at 84; N.Y.
Times, March 13, 1976, at 28, col. 4; id. May 9, 1976, at 9, col. 1 (describing jailbreak
involving 14 American prisoners).
5. Collection of private interviews with American prisoners in Mexico and other investigative materials by Paul Parsons, law student at the University of Texas, and submitted to
the International American Committee of Human Rights.
6. Letters from United States prisoners in Lecumberri Prison, Santa Marta Women's
Prison, and Santa Marta Men's Prison to Hon. Dante B. Fascell (Jan. 15, 1976), cited in U.S.
Citizens Imprisoned in Mexico: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on InternationalPoliticaland
Military Affairs of the House Comm. on InternationalRelations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.2,
at 45-46 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Prisoners].
7. See generally Hearings on Prisoners,supra note 6, pts. 2, 3.
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all contributed to the growing public concern. In Mexico former President
Echeverria's interest in becoming the United Nations Secretary General
and his image as a champion of human rights have created a climate
8
favorable to such advances in international relations.
The problem which the treaty seeks to remedy operates on a humanitarian as well as political level. Its stated purpose is to assist in combating
crime and to further the administration of justice by promoting the offender's social rehabilitation.'
Provisions for Transfer
The procedural framework for "transfer"' 0 of prisoners between the two
countries is contained in the body of the treaty, but specific details remain
undetermined." The terms provide the transferring nation with exclusive
authority to effect a transfer" subject to agreement by the receiving nation and the express consent of the offender.' 4 The prisoner may also
petition the transferring country to initiate the proceedings.' As such, at
least three parties must agree to the transfer and if the conviction is under
authority of an individual state of one of the countries, then both state and
federal authorities must agree.'
The criteria for transfer relate directly to the stated purpose of the
treaty, which is the promotion of the offenders' social rehabilitation. 7 The
nature of the offense, prior criminal record, medical condition, and
8. N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1975, at 7, col. 1; id., Oct. 8, 1975, at 5, col. 1 (President
Echeverria's interest in replacing Kurt Waldheim as United Nations Secretary General); see
Echeverria, Message to America, TIME, Oct. 11, 1976, at 61 (Echeverria discusses his intentions and aspirations for the United States, Mexico, and the Third World).
9. See Treaty, supra note 1, at Preamble; 75 DEP'T STATE BuLL.750 (1976) (press release
announcing signing of the Treaty, dated Nov. 26, 1976). An international standard for prisoner treatment has been codified by the United Nations. E.S.C. Res. 663(c), 24 U.N. ESCOR
Supp. (No. 1) 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957). The implementation of these standards is discussed in Skoler, World Implementation of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
Treatment of Prisoners, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 453 (1975).
10. The program is more properly termed "transfer" rather than "exchange," the popular usage, since no one-for-one requirement is contemplated. Hearings on Prisoners, supra
note 6, pt.3, at 21; San Antonio Light, Jan. 19, 1977, at 1, col. 2-3 (reluctance of officials to
call treaty an exchange).
11. The transfer of prisoners will be administered by the United States Attorneys' Offices
and the additional details will be worked out between the parties by letters rogatory and
conferences with the designated officials in each country. Letter from Hon. Gilbert J. Pena,
Assistant Attorney General of Texas, to author (Mar. 29, 1977).
12. Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV, § 2.
13. Id. art. IV, § 3.
14. See id. art. IV, § 2; id. art. V, § 1.
15. Id. art. IV, § 1.
16. Id. art. IV, § 5.
17. Compare id. Preamble, with id. art. IV, § 4.
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strength of the offender's relation'" with each country must be weighed by
both transferring and receiving parties."
That each country's evaluation of a case may produce an opposing transfer decision results because of different perceptions of the decisive factors
and their relation to the optimal criminal offender rehabilitation standards. That a difference of perceptions exists is admitted by the mere fact
of the treaty. Therefore, these broad criteria will have to be narrowed as
the practice develops or they will become meaningless.
Certain conditions must be met, however, before the procedure can
reach this stage of review. The crime must be one which is "generally
punishable as a crime in the Receiving State."20 The offender must be a
national of the receiving country2' and may not be a domiciliary of the
transferring country. 2 Political,23 military, and immigration offenses are
excluded from the treaty's operation.24 A minimum of six months of the
prisoner's sentence must remain to be served at the time application for
transfer is madel and the time for appeal must also have expired.2"
Once the transfer is accomplished, the remainder of the sentence is to
be served according to the "laws and procedures" of the receiving country,
including parole or conditional release, though the transferring nation does
retain the right to pardon or grant amnesty.27 All pretrial confinement,
time served on the sentence prior to transfer, work-credits,28 and other
considerations to which an offender is entitled must be recognized by the
receiving country and credited toward the offender's remaining time. 29
Finally, the treaty prohibits any violation of the transferee's civil rights,
18. Id. art. IV, § 4. The strength of his connection by residence, domicile, and family
relations are to be specifically considered. Id. art. IV, § 4.
19. Id. art. IV, § 4.
20. Id. art. 11, § 1. The article specifically provides that this condition not be interpreted
to require that the crimes be identical in matters not affecting the character of the crime.
Differences in the length of sentences will not disqualify the operation of the Treaty. Letter
from Hon. Gilbert J. Pena, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, to author (Mar. 29, 1977).
21. Treaty, supra note 1, art. HI,§ 2.
22. Id. art. I, § 3. "'Domiciliary' means a person who has been present in the territory
of one of the parties for at least five years with an intent to remain permanently there-in."
Id. art. IX, § 4.
23. Political offenses are those within the meaning of the Treaty of Extradition of 1899,

Feb. 22, 1899, United States-Mexico, 31 Stat. 1818, T.S. No. 421. Treaty, supra note 1, art.
II, § 4.
24. Treaty, supra note 1, art. I, § 4.
25. Id. art. II, § 5.
26. Id. art. II, § 6.
27. Id. art. V, § 2.
28. Mexico has a system of work credits which allows individuals to serve portions of
their sentences by engaging in labor activities.
29. Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV, § 7.
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other than the ordinary consequences which a foreign conviction may have
on an offender's domestic civil rights. 0
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE TREATY

The treaty appears simply to contemplate authority to execute a foreign
sentence in the offender's home country, but it logically and effectively
provides for the recognition of the validity of foreign criminal judgments.
There is no precedent in the United States for such an agreement with the
exception of an unimplemented provision in the Status of Forces Agreement with South Korea."
Such agreements are not unknown, for legal scholars have urged their
use32 and examples of similar arrangements already exist in Europe. 3 Nine
countries have joined in the recently adopted European Convention on the
International Validity of Criminal Judgments,34 which sets out detailed
procedures for enforcement of criminal sanctions.
One of the primary considerations in the proceedings to enforce a foreign
criminal judgment under the European Convention is the procedure by
which the judgment was rendered. In this regard, the two countries should
have similar cultural, political, social, and legal structures 5 to the extent
that no essential constitutional rights are violated." To assure that the
judgment does not violate these rights, the judicial authority undertakes
a procedure known as exequatur which establishes a method of examining
30. Id. art. V, § 6.
31. July 9, 1966, United States-Republic of Korea, art. XXII, para. 7(b), 17 U.S.T. 1677,
T.I.A.S. No. 6127. No case has been found where the United States enforced a Korean
sentence under the treaty provisions. Memorandum of Law prepared by Professor Detlev F.
Vagts, legal advisor to the Department of State, at 7 (December 15, 1976) (on file in St.
Mary's University Law School Library).
32. See Oehler, Recognition of ForeignPenal Judgments and Their Enforcement, in 2 A
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 261, 276 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda ed. 1973);
Bassiouni, InternationalExtraditionin American Practiceand World Public Order, 36 TENN.
L. REv. 1, 25 (1968).
33. One of the earliest examples is Switzerland which'authorized its Federal Council to
allow a foreign-imposed prison sentence to be served in a Swiss penitentiary. Oehler,
Recognition of ForeignPenalJudgments and Their Enforcement, in 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 261, 263 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda ed. 1973). Spain allows enforcement
of foreign sanctions in its country. For a detailed analysis of the social, political, legal, and
economic implications of reciprocal enforcement in Spain, see A. BRoTONS, EJECUClON DE
SENTENCIAS EXTRANJERAS EN ESPANA (1974). A treaty exists between Spain and Denmark for
reciprocal enforcement of criminal sanctions. Hearings on Prisoners, supra note 6, pt. 3, at
26.
34. May 28, 1970, Europ. T.S. No. 73.
35. Oehler, Recognition of Foreign Penal Judgments and Their Enforcement, in 2 A
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 261, 276 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda ed. 1973).
36. Id. at 276-77.
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the procedural, rather than the substantive, aspects of the foreign judgments. 7
The decision for transfer under the Prisoner Transfer Treaty does not
include such a procedure, but consists only of an evaluation of the offender's social rehabilitation. Because the treaty fails to provide express
procedural safeguards, the courts and Congress will be faced with inevitable constitutional questions arising from implementation of the agreement.38 They will have to determine what standards of due process, if any,
will be required before foreign sentences can be served under United
States' auspices. Questions arise as to whether the test will be full United
States due process guarantees, some lesser standard based on the principles of the foreign country rendering judgment, or an international standard. The first step in answering these questions is an examination of
Mexican law and procedure.
MEXICAN DUE PROCESS

The Political Constitution of Mexico enumerates certain specific guarantees for every criminal trial.3" Conspicuously absent from this list are two
37. Id. at 278. See generally A. BROTONS, EJECUCION DE SENTENCIAS EXTRANJERAS EN
ESPANA (1974).
38. See Hearings on Prisoners,supra note 6, pt.3, at 26. Four constitutional objections
were raised during early stages of discussion on the treaty for transfer of criminal sanctions.
39. CONSTITUCION PoLrrIcA DE LOS ESTADOS MEXICANos art. 20, §§ I-X. The Organization
of American States translation provides:
Article 20. In every criminal trial the accused shall enjoy the following guarantees:
I. He shall be freed on demand and on furnishing bail which shall be fixed by the
judge, according to his status and the gravity of the offense with which he is charged,
provided, however, that such offense is not punishable with more than five years'
imprisonment. No requisites shall be necessary other than placing the stipulated sum
at the disposal of the proper authorities or giving adequate security or personal bond
for acceptance of which the judge is responsible.
The security or bond shall be not more than 250,000 pesos except for offenses by
which the offender profits or the victim suffers financially; for such offenses the security shall be at least three times the amount of the profit obtained or the damage
suffered.
I.
He may not be forced to be a witness against himself; wherefore denial of
access or other means tending to this end is strictly prohibited.
III. He shall be publicly notified within forty-eight hours after being turned over
to the judicial authorities of the name of his accuser and the nature of and cause for
the accusation, so that he may be familiar with the offense with which he is charged,
and reply thereto and make a preliminary statement.
IV. He shall be confronted with the witnesses against him, who shall testify in
his presence if they are to be found in the place where the trial is held, so that he may
cross-examine them in his defense.
V. All witnesses and other evidence which he may offer shall be heard in his
defense, for which he shall be given the time which the law deems necessary for the
purpose; he shall furthermore be assisted in securing the presence of the persons whose
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fundamental United States guarantees: the right to trial by jury40 and the
unqualified right to be confronted by the witnesses." The problem of evaluating Mexican procedure is compounded by the fundamental differences
between the common law system of the United States and the civil law
system of Mexico.
The civil law "trial" is essentially a two step proceeding that begins the
moment the accused is taken into custody.2 During the first step, the
sumario, all evidentiary material is collected by interviews and by inquiry
of the court itself through the prosecutors.' 3 Pleas are formulated and when
testimony he may request, provided they are to be found at the place where the trial
is held.
VI. He shall be entitled to a public trial by a judge or jury of citizens who can
read and write and are also residents of the place and district where the offense was
committed, provided the penalty for such offense exceeds one year's imprisonment.
The accused shall always be entitled to a trial by jury for all offenses committed by
means of the press against the public peace or against the domestic or foreign safety
of the nation.
VII. He shall be furnished with all information on record which he may request
for his defense.
VIII. He shall be tried within four months, if charged with an offense whose
maximum penalty does not exceed two years' imprisonment; and within one year, if
the maximum penalty is greater.
IX. He shall be heard in his own defense, either personally or by counsel, or by
both, as he may desire. Should he have no one to defend him, a list of official counsel
shall be submitted to him, in order that he may choose one or more to act in his
defense. If the accused does not wish to name any counsel for his defense, after being
called upon to do so at the time of his preliminary examination, the court shall appoint
his counsel for the defense. The accused may name his counsel immediately upon
arrest, and shall be entitled to have him present at every stage of the trial; but he shall
be obliged to make him appear as often as required by the court.
X. In no event may imprisonment or detention be extended through failure to
pay counsel fees or for any other monetary obligation, on account of civil liability, or
for other similar cause.
Nor shall detention be extended beyond the time set by law as the maximum for
the offense charged.
The period of detention shall be reckoned as a part of the term of imprisonment
imposed by sentence.
GENERAL SECRETARIAT, ORGANIZATION OF AMERIcAN STATES, CONSTrrurION OF MExico art. 20,

§§ I-X (1917, amended 1972).
40. Id. § VI.
41. Id. § IV.
42. Chattin Case (United States v. Mexico), 1927 Opinions of Commissioners 422, 4 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards 282. The pertinent parts of the case are cited in H. STEINER & D. VAGTS,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 367, 371 (2d ed. 1976). For convenience, subsequent references to Chattin will be to the more accessible Steiner & Vagts reproduction of that case,
and will hereinafter be cited as Chattin.
43. See Chattin, supra note 42, at 371; Keedy, The PreliminaryInvestigation of Crime
in France,88 U. PA. L. REv. 692, 693 (1940); Note, Reform in Criminal Procedure, 50 YALE
L.J. 107, 111 (1940). This analogy is appropriate since the Mexican legal system is based on
the French Civil Code. Perry, Understandingthe Mexican Attorney: Legal Educationand the
Practiceof Law in Mexico, 10 INT'L LAw. 167, 169 (1976).
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the judge considers that he has enough information to make a case, he
places the record at the disposal of the parties for any final additions.4 The
sumario is then closed45 and a brief public hearing, or plenario,48 is subsequently held to formally ratify the accusation and to acknowledge the
defense of the accused. The case is finally closed and the judge makes a
determination of guilt or innocence. 7
The underlying nature of the civil law proceeding is best described as
"inquisitorial," in contrast to the "prosecutorial" nature of the common
law trial. 8 The judge is the central figure in the former by virtue of his
exclusive decision-making power' 9 and his active role in assembling the
facts, witnesses, and other evidence.'" He is given broad discretion to determine the value of testimony and the proper application of the facts to the
law." In contrast, the common law approach relies on the adversaries to
present the facts, witnesses, and arguments. Emphasis is placed on an
impartial trial by a group of peers with the judge functioning as a referee,
leaving the ultimate determination of facts and controlling issues to the
jury.

52

Despite the safeguards provided, there is reason to believe that the enforcement of Mexican constitutional principles falls well below the comparable American standard. A series of cases which arose out of the United
States-Mexican Claims Commission of 1926-1927 provide substantial insight into the view which American courts have taken of Mexican procedural justice. The Commission was created to arbitrate disputes arising
out of mistreatment of Americans by the Mexican government in civil and
criminal contexts.53 In the famous Chattin Case (United States v.
44. Chattin, supra note 42, at 372.

45. Id. at 372.
46. Id. at 372.
47. Id. at 372; see Snee & Pye, Due Process in Criminal Procedure:A Comparison of Two

Systems, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 471 n.18 (1960) (helpful collection of source material on civil
law proceedings).
48. Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE
L.J. 480, 481 (1975); Ploscowe, Development of Inquisitorialand Accusatorial Elements in
French Procedure, 23 J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. L. 372 (1932).

49. Absence of jury in Mexican civil law system leaves the judge in the position of trier
of fact. See Chattin, supra note 42, at 371.
50. See id. at 370; Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in

Europe and America, 48 HAIv. L. REv. 433, 433-34 (1935).
51. See Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in Europe and
America, 48 HARy. L. REv. 433, 433-35 (1935).

52. See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 784 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); 9 id. §§ 2551, 2551a (1940).
53. Arbitrations took place by authority of the Convention of 1923 between the United
States and Mexico establishing a General Claims Commission. A number of cases dealt with
denial of due process and the fundamental trial differences between the two countries. H.
STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 365 (1975); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 165, 179, Reporters Notes (1965).
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Mexico),54 the Commissioners found a denial of procedural justice in several respects and awarded the claimant five thousand dollars compensation for the irregularity of the court proceedings. The court specifically
cited improper evidentiary investigations, lack of confrontation of the witnesses, delay of the proceedings, failure to apprise the accused of the
charges brought against him, and "a continued absence of seriousness on
the part of the court."55 More recently, in hearings before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee
on International Relations," procedural justice violations 7 were found to
have been present in eighteen percent of the Mexican criminal cases involving Americans, despite increasing diplomatic recognition of the problem.5"
UNITED STATES DUE PROCESS

Recognition of Civil Judgments
The features of Mexican procedural justice clearly differ from those of
the United States, but the critical issue is the determination of which
standards the United States will apply in foreign judgment enforcement.
Courts have often recognized foreign civil judgments" and some states
have made such recognition statutory. 0 In the landmark case of Hilton v.
54. Chattin, supra note 42, at 367.
55. Id.at 370.
56. Hearings on Prisoners, supra note 6.
57. The eight violations tabulated by the Department of State deal specifically with
occurrences outside of the trial proceeding. They include denial of access and visitation by
consular officials and legal counsel, claims of innocence, abuse at the time of arrest, confiscation of property, abuse in prison, extortion by attorney, and prolonged detention. In a total
of 535 cases of Americans imprisoned in Mexico as of July 1975, there were 835 allegations of
violations. According to the Department of State, 30% were substantiated, 16% were unsubstantiated, and 50% fell into the "inconclusive" category. Hearingson Prisoners,supra note
6, pt.2, at 48-9.
58. Id. pt.3, at 6.
59. Recognition of foreign civil judgments is based on comity. In re Colorado Corp., 531
F.2d 463, 469 (10th Cir. 1976) (bankruptcy court abused its discretion in not granting comity
to decrees of Luxembourg and the Netherlands). The proceedings must be fair and regular
and the subject must have been appropriate for the court to adjudicate. Zorgias v. SS Hellenic
Star, 370 F. Supp. 591, 593 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1973). In addition
to the requirement of fair procedure, United States courts will ordinarily recognize and
enforce a foreign civil judgment if the requisites for adjudicatory jurisdiction were present..
Spann v. Compania Mexicana Radiodifusora Fronteriza, S.A., 131 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir.
1942) (unsuccessful argument by American citizen that unfavorable judgment rendered
against him in Mexico could not be enforced against him in Texas); Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,
Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865, 872 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971); Banco
Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 537, 172 S.W. 711, 714 (1915) (court normally recognizes foreign
civil judgments if rendered according to due process, but if foreign court has no personal
jurisdiction, judgment will not be recognized).
60. Nine states have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act:
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Guyot,6" the United States Supreme Court established that a judgment
rendered after a full and fair trial before a court of competent jurisdiction
under "a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice" should not be denied comity in the United States. 2 The
Court rejected several arguments against recognition including one based
on the alleged failure of a plaintiff to submit to cross-examination. 3 Courts
have followed Hilton's requirement that basic elements of due process be
present, but have disagreed on which elements are necessary."'
The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Act cites failure to render the
judgment by means "compatible with the requirements of due process of
law" as a basis for denial of recognition. 5 In addition to this nebulous
requirement, judgments will be recognized if they are rendered by an impartial tribunal which has jurisdiction over the defendant and which does
not contravene the public policy of the recognizing state." The Uniform
Act has been adopted by only nine states, 7 but it acts as a composite
statement of the previous common law on the subject.
InternationalCriminal Law
Though it appears that foreign civil judgments are rendered under a
lesser standard of domestic due process,69 there is no guarantee that the
same standard will be adopted for criminal judgments. 6 The very personal
and inalienable rights which accrue to the accused from the Constitution
make serious analogy with civil practice wholly inadequate. As such, the
most valuable analysis comes from cases considering criminal judgments.
Cases discussing due process and constitutional trial guarantees in the
context of United States involvement in international criminal law are
Alaska, California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Oklahoma, and
Washington. 13 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 269 (Supp. 1977).
61. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
62. Id. at 202.
63. Id. at 204-05.

64. This is due, at least in part, to the inability of courts to define the changing concept
of due process. See Snee & Pye, Due Process in Criminal Procedure:A Comparison of Two
Systems, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 468 (1960).
65. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AcT § 4(a)(1).
66. Id. § 4(a), (b).
67. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT; see note 60 supra. Adoption
of the act is being proposed to the Texas Legislature during the 1977 session. Legislative Item,
40 TEX. B.J. 40 (1977).
68. Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313, 1319 (2d Cir.
1973) (action to enforce Curacaon judgment in New York), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974).
69. Pye, The Effect of Foreign Criminal Judgments in the United States, 32 U. Mo. KAN.
CITY L. REv. 114, 115 (1964).
70. See Mueller, InternationalJudicialAssistance in Criminal Matters, 7 VILL. L. REV.

193, 219 (1961-62); Pye, The Effect of Foreign Criminal Judgments in the United States, 32
U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REv. 114, 115 (1964).
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generally of three types: extradition, international kidnapping, and those
recognizing collateral effects of criminal judgments.
Extradition cases usually arise in the context of a habeas corpus challenge to the extradition of a United States citizen to a foreign country on
the grounds that the requesting nation lacked due process safeguards.
Neely v. Henkel" established that constitutional guarantees have no application to individuals who commit crimes outside the jurisdiction of the
United States against the laws of a foreign country." The Supreme Court
further asserted that United States citizenship does not carry with it the
right to trial in a manner different from that followed in the country
against which the offense is committed.73 Courts have continued to follow
Neely though judges have often expressed reluctance when the requesting
country's procedural justice violated acceptable standards.74 Some courts
have denied extradition on other grounds," perhaps in an effort to avoid
the unjust results.
Judicial discomfort with the Neely doctrine has not prompted its demise
because of the nature of the extradition proceeding. The rarefied atmosphere of diplomatic exchange7" insulates the courts from a position of approbation or participation in questionable foreign procedural justice. The
judges can continue to adhere to Neely without disturbing their constitutional sensibilities by blaming the foreign government for the prospective
injustice or denial of due process.
The level of United States judicial involvement in questionable foreign
due process is increased in international kidnapping cases,77 and courts
have consequently expressed greater concern that due process be afforded
citizens subject to foreign criminal process." In United States v. Toscan71. 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
72. Id. at 122.
73. Id. at 123.
74. See, e.g., Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851
(1960); Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258, 263-64 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 818 (1957); In
re Mylonas, 187 F. Supp. 716, 721 (N.D. Ala. 1960)(in absentia conviction).
75. See, e.g., In re Mylonas, 187 F. Supp. 716, 721 (N.D. Ala. 1960) (in absentia conviction did not prevent extradition, but it was denied on other grounds); Ex parte Fudera, 162
F. 591, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1908) (in absentia conviction not discussed though extradition was
denied because the Italian government had offered only hearsay evidence), appeal dismissed,
219 U.S. 589 (1911).
76. See Schultz, The General Framework of Extradition and Asylum, in 2 A TREATISE
ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

309, 322 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda ed. 1973). 18 U.S.C. §

3181 (Supp. V 1975) lists the current extradition treaties which the United States maintains.
77. The United States has resorted to international kidnapping as a means of acquiring
jurisdiction over individuals suspected of violating American law. See generally Comment,
JurisdictionFollowing Illegal ExtraterritorialSeizure: InternationalHuman Rights Obligations as an Alternative to Constitutional Stalemate, 54 TEXAs L. REv. 1439 (1976); Recent
Development, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 131 (1976).
78. Compare Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901), with United States v. Toscanino,
500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol9/iss1/7

10

Kennedy: Execution of Foreign Sentences in the United States: A Treaty wit

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:118

ino, 5 United States agents participated in "kidnapping" a known heroin
smuggler from Uruguay in order to bring him before the United States
District Court of New York to answer charges. The defendant made allegations of extreme physical torture and abuse which he alleged occurred
during the arrest stage outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States." The Second Circuit held that should the allegations be proven, it
would be bound to release the defendant because of the flagrantly illegal
law enforcement conduct.8 It apparently felt compelled to disassociate
itself and the American judicial system from a case so tainted by unconstitutionality. Accepting jurisdiction over the defendant and proceeding to
judgment would not only have inextricably involved the United States in
unacceptable foreign process, but would also have been an intolerable
acquiescence in those practices. Subsequent cases have arguably constituted a retreat from Toscanino, but none have involved such gross violations of United States or international standards of human rights.82
The question of American involvement in foreign criminal judgments is
particularly acute in cases dealing with the recognition of the collateral
effects of such judgments. While American courts have given collateral
effect to some, it is clear that due process must be satisfied." One recent
case in this area, Cooley v. Weinberger,4 involved the denial of Social
Security benefits to a wife because she had been convicted by an Iranian
court of her husband's murder. The wife argued that several due process
guarantees were denied her, 5 but the administrative law judge's review of
the Iranian trial revealed a criminal process in Iran similar to that in the
79. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
80. Id. at 270.
81. Id. at 275-76.
82. Compare United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), with Lujan v.
Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.)(kidnapping occurred without the severe torture associated with
Toscanino), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975), and United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir.) (kidnapping authorized because U.S. agents did not directly participate), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 847 (1975), and United States v. Orsini, 402 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)(participation of U.S. agents in torture warranted evidentiary hearing to determine whether due
process was violated).
83. Professor A. Kenneth Pye has written extensively on these collateral effects, which
include state double jeopardy, foreign conviction recognition by state multiple offender statutes, exclusion of immigrants on the basis of foreign conviction, and impeachment of a
witness in an American trial by establishing a previous foreign conviction. See generally, Pye,
The Effect of ForeignCriminal Judgments in the United States, 32 U. Mo. KA. Crry L. REv.
114, 120-135 (1964). In the multiple offender statute cases, satisfaction of due process is a
prerequisite to recognition, but the immigration exclusion does not require establishing procedural justice safeguards. Id. at 128, 132.
84. 518 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1975).
85. She contended denial of the right: (1) to access to her attorney; (2) to be advised of
her rights; (3) to post bail; (4) to have indictment issue; (5) to cross-examine the witnesses
against her; and (6) to be proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Id. at 1154.
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United States."6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed and indicated that had the procedural steps followed in the Iranian proceeding been "bizarre, arbitrary or capricious" the decision might
have been different." The court's statement about Iranian law gives a clue
to the United States' attitude towards a foreign trial. Should these same
rights be guaranteed United States citizens on trial in Mexico, it is unlikely
that the constitutional difficulties raised by the treaty will prevent its
implementation.
One further indicant of United States due process expectations in international criminal dealings may be found in its Status of Forces Agreements"8 (SOFA). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization SOFA'9 is typical of most in that it lists seven specific guarantees that a foreign country
seeking to exercise criminal jurisdiction over United States military personnel must follow." The United States Senate's advice and consent to the
agreement added the extra protection or clarification that the United
States defendant must be afforded all the rights guaranteed by the Constitution in a domestic trial." Despite the fact that the provisions apply only
to persons connected with the Armed Services," these guarantees constitute the most specific statements of United States international procedural
justice expectations.
It is clear that the inherent differences of the civil and common law
criminal procedure will not automatically disqualify a foreign criminal
judgment from the possibility of recognition. 3 Consequently, the United
States will not insist on complete reproduction of the procedural safeguards of the fourteenth amendment. This insistence on domestic standards of due process in international dealings seems unlikely to serve the
86. Id. at 1155.
87. Id. at 1155.
88. Such agreements are primarily intended to clarify the criminal jurisdiction which a
foreign country may exercise over friendly armed forces stationed in that country. Holmes v.
Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1212 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972). They establish
procedures for exercise of jurisdiction by the foreign country or provide for transfer of jurisdiction to the individual's home country. The U.S. has 25 SOFA agreements in force. S. REP.
No. 1434, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 8-9 (1970). There is a significant amount of literature on these
agreements. See, e.g., T. SNEE & A. PYE, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS: CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION (1957); Norton, United States Obligations Under Status of Forces Agreements:
A New Method of Extradition?, 5 GA. J. OF INT'L & CoMP. L. 1 (1975); Note, Criminal
Jurisdiction Over American Forces Abroad, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1043 (1957).
89. June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
90. Id. art. VII(9).
91. 99 CONG. Rac. 8780 (1953), cited in Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1224 n.98 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972).
92. NATO SOFA, June 19, 1951, art. VII(9), 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
93. See Cooley v. Weinberger, 518 F.2d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 1975); Pye, The Effect of
Foreign Criminal Judgments in the United States, 32 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. Rav. 114, 115
(1964).
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interests of the United States or of the international community."
Nevertheless, it is also clear that the United States will not recognize
judgments which fall too far below the standard of due process. 5 Therefore,
in striking a balance grounded on consent, the most reasonable standard
which exists and the one most likely to be followed seems to be the international standard."
INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS

Different conceptions of the functions of government and the rights of
the individual have produced different levels of guarantee and enforcement, but during the past twenty-five years, a number of international
instruments have been drawn to establish a minimum standard of procedural justice. 7 Prominent among them is the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms," which is a modern composite
formulation of international justice. It binds signatories to protect human
rights by providing specific remedies for violation of the terms of the agreement. 9 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,," of
which the United States is not a member, has established similar guidelines for a standard of international procedural justice."'1 Another recent
instrument that provides specific guidelines for procedural justice is the
94. International criminal law scholars criticize the view that superiority of domestic
procedures should preclude recognition of foreign judgments. See Mueller, InternationalJudicial Assistance in Criminal Matters, 7 VILL. L. Rav. 193, 220 (1961-62); Pye, The Effect of
Foreign Criminal Judgments in the United States, 32 U. Mo. KAN. Crr L. REv. 114, 115-16
(1964).
95. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 165, 178-82 (1965). With regard to the

United States Senate's insistence on due process guarantees demonstrated by their advice
and consent to NATO SOFA see 99 CONG. Rac. 8780 (1953).
96. Oehler, Recognition of Foreign Penal Judgments and Their Enforcement, in 2 A
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 261, 277 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda ed. 1973)

(suggestion that European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms serves as good procedural justice standard for foreign penal judgment recognition).
97. See Stone, Range of Crimes for a Feasible InternationalJurisdiction,in TowAIR A
FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 315, 317-22 (J. Stone & R. Woetzel ed. 1970).
98. Nov. 4, 1950, § 1, arts. 5-7, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. No. 5, cited in 45 Am. J. INT'L
L. 24 (1951). The agreement was originally signed by 13 countries; 2 others have since joined.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 195 (G. Mueller & E. Wise ed. 1965).
99. Many international agreements acted as mere statements of principle or declaratoryhortatory instruments. An example of this type is the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) (especially arts. 10, 11); see Stone, Range
of Crimes for A Feasible International Jurisdiction,in TOWARD A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 315, 320 (J. Stone & R. Woetzel ed. 1970).

100. G.A. Res. 220, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
reprinted in 61 AM. J. IN'L L. 870 (1967).
101. Id. arts. 13, 14, 17, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. at 875-76.
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Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries
to Aliens.'
Several United States instruments have embraced the fundamentals of
the international standard of justice, which indicates a willingness to compromise the inherent differences of legal institutions and cultures in favor
of a workable statement of human rights. The multilateral character of the
NATO SOFA gives it the effect of an international set of principles and
demonstrates the similarity between United States and international standards. The seven procedural justice guarantees which it contains are similar to those established in some of the international conventions 03 and are
broad enough to be operative in civil and common law systems. The
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law also embraces the international
standard of justice that is derived from the relevant principles of these
international agreements as well as "international custom, judicial and
arbitral decisions."'0 4 It incorporates trial procedure similar to the NATO
SOFA requirements, but lists additional guarantees to be afforded during
the arrest and detention stages.0 5 The international agreements and domestic instruments that contain like provisions point the United States in
the direction of an international standard.
IMPLEMENTING THE TREATY

Since Mexican procedures appear to meet this international standard,
there should be no constitutional difficulty in implementing the treaty.' °5
Should lagging Mexican practice render its constitutional safeguards
merely theoretical, 7 however, United States courts will be hard-pressed
to find a basis for enforcing such questionable sanctions. A writ of habeas
corpus challenging imprisonment under the treaty in this event might be
successful, despite the fact that enforcement of a treaty is the duty of the
executive branch. 0 8
102. See Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests
of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 548 (1961).
103. Compare NATO SOFA, June 19, 1951, art. VII(9), 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. 2846,
with European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, §
1, arts. 5, 6, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. No. 5.
104. RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 165

(1965).
105. Id. §§ 178-82. See generally Wise, Note on InternationalStandardsof Criminal Law
and Administration, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 135 (G. Mueller & E. Wise ed. 1965).
106. The only divergence appears to be in the right to cross-examine witnesses, which is
guaranteed only if the witness can be found in the place where the trial is held. There is no
provision for compulsory process in such cases. CONSTITUCION POLrITCA DE LOS ESTADOS
MEXICANOS art. 20, § IV (1917, amended 1972), translationquoted in note 39 supra.
107. Evidence of this lagging enforcement of the stated constitutional guarantees has

been collected by the Department of State. See Hearings on Prisoners,supra note 6, pt. 3, at
6.
108. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952)(enforcement ofa treaty
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It has been suggested that should the standards fall below those acceptable for recognition of foreign criminal judgments, the transferred sanctions
could nevertheless be legally executed because the offender expressly consented to the transfer.'" In essence the consent would act as a waiver of
the unconstitutional trial practices under which sentence was rendered in
much the same way that one might waive a jury trial. Though United
States practice permits some rights to be waived,"' it is hardly conceivable
that those rights may be waived after they have been violated.
An additional, but less pressing, problem occurs as a result of the differences in the length of sentences imposed for crimes in Mexico and the
United States. The sentences and parole regulations for drug violations in
Mexico are much stricter than for the comparable offense in the United
States. As an example, the Mexican sentence for possession of marijuana
is two to nine years without parole;'" a similar offender in the United
States may draw no sentence at all." 2 This consideration is significant
because approximately eighty-five percent of the American prisoners currently in Mexican jails are drug offenders." 3 Transferring such harsh sentences to the United States has been considered a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws."' Though it seems unlikely
that this argument will be persuasive enough to affect implementation of
the treaty, it does point out some of the inequity that may appear.
Practically speaking, there should be no difficulty with this objection,
for the treaty provides that the sentences are to be "carried out according
to the laws and procedures" of the receiving country."' The provision specifically refers to parole, conditional release, and other provisions for reduction of sentences. Though the Mexican sentences are to be fully transferred to the United States, many offenders would be eligible for immediis the duty of the political department of the government); Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211,
1225 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (court refused to consider whether German court complied with NATO
SOFA trial guarantees where there were other remedies available before court's jurisdiction
could be involved).
109.,Memorandum of Law prepared by Professor Detlev F. Vagts for the U.S. Dept. of
State on the subject of the Mexican Treaty, at 10 (Dec. 15, 1976) (on file in St. Mary's
University Law School Library), citing Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Jolley v.
INS, 441 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946 (1971).
110. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937) (jury trial held not "fundamental" within meaning of fourteenth amendment); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S.
188, 208 (1916).
111. CODIGO PENAL arts. 193-95 (1972), which fixes marijuana penalties at two to nine
years and opium at three to twelve years.
112. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1970) which provides for no more than one year in prison or
immediate probation at the discretion of the judge.
113. Hearings on Prisoners, supra note 6, pt.3, at 22-23 (490 of 603 U.S. citizens in
Mexican jails were involved in drug related offenses as of June 1, 1976).
114. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.
115. Treaty, supra note 1, art. V, § 2.
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ate release under the laws of the United States."' This is particularly true
of the minor offenders who may have already served a length of time in
Mexico comparable to the United States sentence for the same offense. In
cases where a more serious offense has occurred or the individual is a
known offender, parole could be delayed indefinitely at the discretion of
the government. In addition to becoming an important law enforcement
mechanism, the treaty may be an effective means to secure the release of
United States citizens imprisoned abroad, for the President has a statutory
mandate to press for release where imprisonment is unjust."7
CONCLUSION

Ratification of the Prisoner Exchange Treaty with Mexico will thrust the
United States into a novel area of international criminal law producing
important national and international implications. It will force the United
States to define its constitutional guidelines for international criminal
practice and will place the country on the growing list of those who already
maintain agreements for reciprocal enforcement of criminal sanctions.
The prospects for expanding the agreement with other nations are
good,"' but the courts must proceed cautiously to avoid diluting the constitutional standards on which the United States insists. Maintaining this
cautious approach may, ironically, deny some prisoners essential human
rights, but the remedy for such denial does not lie in full scale compromise
of due process."' Practical politics, even in the name of human rights or
advancement of international law, is not a valid justification for denying
full due process. The spotlight which the agreement has focused on the
prisoner treatment problem will probably obviate the need to turn to such
remedies and will allow effective operation of the treaty provisions by
forcing Mexico to deal with United States citizens in a manner not violative of their constitutional rights or the comparable international standard.
116. Drug offenders prosecuted under federal law may receive immediate conditional
release at the judge's discretion. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1971). Many state laws have similar and
even more liberal provisions. See, e.g. Texas Controlled Substances Act, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 4476-15, §§ 4.01, 4.12 (1976).
117. It is the duty of the President to "use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as
he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release .
22 U.S.C. §
1732 (1970).
118. Negotiations with Canada have already begun for execution of a treaty similar to
the Mexican agreement. Letter from Detlev F. Vagts, legal advisor on the Mexican Treaty to
Dep't of State, to the author (March 1, 1977).

119. The remedy should be sought through invocation of the international standards of
justice established by the United Nations. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec.10,
1948, art. 5, 3 U.N. GOAR (I Resolutions) 71, reproduced in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 127 (Supp.
1949).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol9/iss1/7

16

Kennedy: Execution of Foreign Sentences in the United States: A Treaty wit

134

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:118

Editor's Note: The treaty was signed by both parties on November 25,
1976, and approved by the Mexican Senate on December 30, 1976. It was
reported to the United States Senate by President Carteron February 16,
1977. Committee hearings are expected to begin in mid-summer on advice
and consent to the treaty. In addition, enabling legislation must be introduced and approved by both Houses of Congress.
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